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STANDING AND THE STATUTORY UNIVERSE
WILLIAM W. BUZBEE*
In 1988, William Fletcher published The Structure of Standing.1
Professor Fletcher persuasively argued that where Congress has con-
ferred a cause of action, standing analysis, to be constitutionally
sound and logically defensible, necessarily turns on analysis of the
particular cause of action conferred by Congress.  Similar arguments
were made around the same time and in subsequent scholarship of
Professors Gene Nichol, Richard Pierce, and Cass Sunstein.2
Despite the power of these scholars’ arguments, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife3 took a decidedly
different approach.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion undoubtedly re-
quired, at a minimum, that Article III courts only recognize standing
for litigants if the courts find that the litigant has suffered constitu-
tionally sufficient “injury in fact” that is traceable to the defendant
and redressable by the courts.  As a prudential or statutory matter,
courts must also determine if a litigant seeking standing is within “the
zone of interests” relevant to the statutory cause of action.   In one
sense, Lujan decisively rejected the idea that the presence of a legisla-
tively conferred cause of action could end standing analysis; Article
* Professor of Law, Emory Law School.  The author thanks Duke Law School and the
Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum for the opportunity to submit this article in connec-
tion with the March, 2000 conference on “Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st
Century: From Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond.”  The author particularly thanks Lisa Chang,
John Echeverria, William Mayton, Robert Schapiro and Maxwell Stearns and research assis-
tants Ellen Baker and Eden Doniger for their suggestions and brainstorming regarding this arti-
cle and the law of standing.
1. 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing and Public Law Litigation, 42
DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Ju-
dicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 161 (1992)
[hereinafter Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?]; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Priva-
tization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law].  For a pre-Lujan analysis of metaphors used in standing analysis
and the questionable historical roots of current standing frameworks, see Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
3. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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III courts must, at a minimum, determine that a litigant has a suffi-
ciently real stake in the litigation such that she satisfies an Article III
court’s analysis of the presence of “injury in fact.”  This is likely a set-
tled core of constitutional standing analysis—courts must ensure that
a litigant has a stake in a litigated dispute that in some sense sets that
litigant apart from the general public.
As argued in this article, however, close analysis of Lujan and
subsequent major Supreme Court standing cases reveals that despite
the courts’ substantial standing role, the “statutory universe” of leg-
islatively created goals, procedures and incentives remains central to
standing analysis.  Standing cases decided by the Court since Lujan
provide further guidance regarding the contours of constitutional
standing analysis.  Bennett v. Spear,4 Steel Company v. Citizens for a
Better Environment,5 Federal Election Commission v. Akins6 and now,
perhaps most significantly, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services, Inc.7 further flesh out the standing framework.8
Lower courts have also grappled with the Supreme Court’s rapidly
evolving, or perhaps scattering, jurisprudence.  Professor Pierce has
questioned if there is much law here at all, arguing that political pref-
erences best explain the Court’s active redrawing of the lines and
elements of standing jurisprudence.9  Two notable Courts of Appeals
decisions, Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Mag-
nesium Elektron, Inc.10 and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Cop-
per Recycling Corp.,11 interpreted Lujan in a particularly expansive
manner that this article finds unjustified, further expanding on the ju-
dicial role in erecting standing hurdles.12  The recent en banc rejection
of the Gaston panel’s decision approached standing in a manner
4. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
5. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
6. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
7. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
8. See infra Part I for discussion of these cases.  Subsequent to the March, 2000 conference
at which this paper was first presented, the Court decided Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).  In evaluating a plaintiff’s standing to
bring a qui tam whistleblower action, the Court found standing based on the deep historical
roots of qui tam actions and explained the propriety of such standing by characterizing the
plaintiff as an assignee of the government’s interest in a damages claim.  This case shed little
new light on the issues addressed by this article, but is briefly discussed infra notes 105, 185 and
accompanying text.
9. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999).
10. 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
11. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
12. See infra at Part I.E.
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similar to that suggested by this article, but this article disagrees with
several concurring judges’ contention that Laidlaw was unexpected
and a major shift in the law of standing.
The Laidlaw case is particularly important to discerning and re-
solving the disparate standing law strains and approaches of the Su-
preme Court.  As shown below, a consistent strain in the last decade’s
standing jurisprudence calls for judges to serve in a central but never-
theless limited standing gatekeeping role that still gives statutory
frameworks a central role in standing analysis.  However, a competing
strain in standing analysis—most often articulated by Justice Scalia in
opinions that have at times garnered a court majority, but more often
garnered only a plurality or court minority—seeks to expand that ju-
dicial gatekeeping role under the standing framework.  These com-
peting strains of logic and opinion language can be analogized to a
symphonic musical moment in which a listener cannot yet discern if
the orchestra is playing in a minor or major mode, or perhaps modu-
lating to a different key.  Only when the passage resolves itself can
one fully comprehend the preceding passage and discern the music’s
direction.  Laidlaw is akin to such a musical resolution.
The seven justice Laidlaw majority resolved these competing
strains by embracing the persistent, albeit contested, strain in stand-
ing jurisprudence that calls for a more limited and deferential judicial
standing role.  Legislative judgments about statutory goals and
means, or what I in this article refer to as “the statutory universe,” re-
ceive substantial deference by courts under this consistent line of
standing analysis.  Political inclinations may explain much about why
particular justices reach particular results, but close scrutiny of the
Court’s standing opinions and the stated rationales garnering majority
support reveals that Laidlaw is in harmony with a more judicially re-
strained line of standing law.13
This article develops its thesis by offering two lines of analysis
and argument regarding standing law.  The article first demonstrates
that, as a matter of case interpretation, the Justice Scalia Lujan opin-
13. Subsequent to presentation of this conference paper at Duke Law School in March of
2000, several other scholars had analyzed Laidlaw’s implications.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber,
Environmental Litigation after Laidlaw, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,516 (July 2000); Michael P. Healy,
Standing in Environmental Citizen Suits:  Laidlaw’s Clarification of the Injury-in-Fact and Re-
dressability Requirements, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,455 (June 2000); Craig N. Johnston, Standing
and Mootness after Laidlaw, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,317 (May 2000).  Professor Sunstein also
briefly alludes to Laidlaw in his recent analysis of standing for animals.  See Cass R. Sunstein, A
Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst:  Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1333, 1343-44 (2000).
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ion, the critically important Lujan concurrence of Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Souter, and subsequent Supreme Court standing
cases up to and including Laidlaw, do not justify standing analysis
that ignores the universe of interests and incentives created by a stat-
ute.  While a majority of the Court undoubtedly requires the federal
judiciary to ensure that a particular plaintiff has a “real” stake in the
dispute underlying a litigation, nothing in Lujan or subsequent Su-
preme Court standing cases justifies ignoring or belittling the statu-
tory interests Congress has sought to further in a statute conferring a
cause of action.14
Second, this article offers a normative argument that conceptions
of legislative supremacy and considerations of institutional compe-
tence confirm the soundness of a more limited judicial standing role.
Litigants and courts should defer to Congress in the standing arena by
both accepting legislative goals as sufficiently real to justify litigant
standing and by accepting the importance of whatever procedures
Congress has selected to further attainment of legislative goals.
Drawing by analogy on the assertion of Justice Scalia and Judges
Easterbrook and Posner in the non-constitutional statutory interpre-
tation arena that courts should not simply seek to further general
statutory purposes, but instead should enforce the particular and pre-
sumably limited bargain struck by Congress, this article argues that
similar logic should prevail in standing analysis.  All legislative bar-
gains are limited and uncertain of attaining their articulated goals.
Nevertheless, any violation of the regulatory scheme resulting from
that bargain should be construed as having an effect.  The statutory
universe of goals and means should be accepted by courts, even if the
courts must still ensure that litigants have a real stake in their case.
Only litigants utterly lacking a connection to the interest or area af-
14. In so interpreting these cases, this article does not rely on a history-based theory re-
garding how standing law should be framed.  Historical analysis to date indicates that standing
law is primarily a late 20th century construct and that the limited historical antecedents are in-
consistent with a substantial judicial gatekeeping role.  See Evan Caminker, The Constitutional-
ity of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989); Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?, supra
note 2; Winter, supra note 2.  As stated by then-Judge Patricia Wald in a 1993 essay, “the
Court’s standing cases . . . are very obviously and forthrightly incorporating a political (in the
broadest sense of the word) philosophy about the function of federal courts.  There is no way
that the origin of the increasingly tough three-pronged standing test—injury, causation, redress-
ability—can be traced to the stark constitutional phrase ‘case or controversy.’”  Patricia M.
Wald, The Cinematic Supreme Court: 1991-92 Term, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 238, 239 (1993).  For
a contrary and overtly anti-regulatory spin on environmental law and standing rooted in an at-
torney’s strong belief in property rights, see MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 1-7, 42-63 (1996).
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fected by the legal violation should be turned away on standing
grounds.  Provided that a litigant has such a connection to the area or
interest affected by a legal violation, courts should show deference to
the legislature in evaluating the existence of injury in fact, traceabil-
ity, and redressability of the plaintiff’s claim.  Based on both close
analysis of standing jurisprudence and these normative arguments,
the Magnesium Elektron opinion and the original panel majority
opinion in Gaston are egregiously unsound.
Part I sketches out highlights of the Supreme Court’s major
standing opinions from Lujan to Laidlaw.  Assuming a reader already
familiar with the basics of these cases, this Part focuses on language
revealing what questions are for Article III courts alone and what
questions still must be shaped by deferential acceptance of legislative
goals and means as made manifest in relevant statutes.  Part II ex-
plores the rationale for legislative supremacy and the reasons courts
are ill-suited to second guess implicit or explicit legislative articula-
tions of societal interests and choices of procedural means to those
ends.  This Part develops a normative argument for why courts should
defer to legislatively set ends and means.  This argument draws on
statutory interpretation arguments, legislative supremacy concep-
tions, and related analysis of comparative institutional competence of
courts and the political branches.
Part III concedes that the discussions in Parts I and II weigh
strongly in favor of a conclusion that Lujan itself is unsound.  Judicial
narrowing of a citizen-suit provision will have inevitable effects on the
regulatory process.  Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the presence of an “injury” without looking at the under-
lying statutory scheme.  This Part also concedes, however, that Lujan
and its progeny have at this point created settled law establishing at
least a narrow independent Article III court determination of the suf-
ficiency of a litigant’s interest in a dispute.  Nevertheless, whether as-
sessing a litigant’s “injury in fact,” or examining traceability or re-
dressability of the law violation underlying a plaintiff’s claim, courts
must conduct their analysis in light of the interests created or recog-
nized and the procedures chosen by Congress.
Courts may now have an ensconced role in evaluating the actu-
ality of a litigant’s interest in a public law dispute, but that role must
be a narrow one that does not ignore or question legislative judg-
ments about political goals and process.  Justice Scalia, in particular,
prefers a much broader judicial gatekeeping role through standing
doctrine.  However, neither his own logic nor a consistent majority of
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the Supreme Court supports a recasting of standing doctrine to allow
courts to evaluate de novo whether legislative goals are sufficiently
tangible or whether the means to those goals are suitable.  As con-
firmed and resolved by Laidlaw, a consistent Supreme Court majority
calls for a much more limited and deferential judicial standing role.
I.  INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL STANDING ANALYSIS VERSUS
STATUTORY INFLUENCE
This Part’s analysis of standing law takes as its starting point the
Court’s opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.  Although Lujan
itself has been much analyzed and criticized, this article takes its
majority opinion and the important Justice Kennedy-Souter
concurrence (perhaps better characterized as a partial dissent) as the
most important base text from which subsequent opinions have
embarked.  This Part then reviews post-Lujan standing opinions, with
emphasis on language reflecting the appropriate roles of courts and
the legislature in determining citizen standing.
A.  Lujan’s Expanded Judicial Role and Lujan’s Limits
In Lujan, the Court concluded that the named plaintiffs had
not established at the summary judgment stage of their case a suffi-
cient link to an injury that would flow from a lack of agency consulta-
tion over potential endangered species impacts of partial United
States funding of projects in foreign countries.15  Prior to the case, the
Secretary of the Interior had promulgated a regulation newly inter-
preting the Federal Endangered Species Act (the “ESA”) as inappli-
cable to foreign projects supported by U.S. dollars.16  In accordance
with this interpretation, no consultation concerning endangered spe-
cies impacts occurred regarding several foreign projects.  Although
these plaintiffs in the past had connections to locations abroad where
endangered species existed and where United States funding might
have contributed to harm to these species, Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion denied the plaintiffs’ standing.  The presence of a broad citi-
zen-suit provision ostensibly conferring a cause of action on “any per-
son” to complain of violations of the ESA was insufficient to end
standing analysis.
In his Lujan opinion, Justice Scalia articulated Article III stand-
ing criteria in a manner that struck down dozens of statutes’ citizen-
15. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
16. See id. at 557-58.
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suit provisions.17  Particularly in the environmental law arena, citizen-
suit provisions authorize “any person” to sue government entities for
a failure to act in conformity with “nondiscretionary” obligations and
to sue regulatory targets for virtually any violation of obligations im-
posed pursuant to the enabling act.18  Lujan declared unconstitutional
attempts to utilize such provisions by citizens lacking what the Court
majority referred to as “actual” or “concrete” “injury in fact.”19  The
majority opinion made clear that while Congress can create causes of
action for injuries not previously cognizable in the courts,20 the mere
intent of Congress to confer such a cause of action does not end Arti-
cle III analysis.21  All plaintiffs must be able to show that their threat-
ened interest and alleged injury add up to a type of interest or injury
that the courts determine to be “actual,” “particularized,” and “con-
crete.”22  Lujan emphatically resolved, contrary to Professor
Fletcher’s analysis and language in another Supreme Court case,23
17. For a cross section of the many articles discussing Lujan with a largely critical content,
see Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act Standing in Light of Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169 (1997); Patti A. Meeks, Justice Scalia and
the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 343 (1993); Nichol,
supra note 2; Pierce, supra note 2; Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2.  For
scholarly critiques defending Justice Scalia and Lujan, see GREVE, supra note 14, at 99-101, 108
n.1; Marshall J. Breger, Defending Defenders: Remarks on Nichol and Pierce, 42 DUKE L.J.
1202 (1993); John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219
(1993).  For articles focusing on “procedural” rights and injuries and the impacts of Lujan, see
Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of Environmental Standing: Proce-
dural and Informational Injury-in-Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345 (1994); Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75 (1995); Bruce Morris, How
Footnote 7 in Lujan II May Expand Standing for Procedural Injuries, 9 NAT. RES. & ENVT. 75
(1995); Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275 (1995).
18. For excellent reviews of the history and content of citizen-suit provisions in environ-
mental laws, see ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 667-71 (2d ed. 1996); Barton H. Thompson, The Continuing Innovation
of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185.
19. See 504 U.S. at 560, 573-74.  Prior to Lujan, Professor Fletcher’s powerful critique of
the Court’s standing jurisprudence questioned the existence of some objective “injury in fact.”
See Fletcher, supra note 1.  Professor Sunstein criticized Lujan for similar reasons, questioning
the Court’s assumption that it could objectively determine the existence of an “injury.”  See
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2.
20. The Court stated that Congress can “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law. . . .” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
21. See id. at 577 (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944)).
22. See id. at 560.
23. See id. at 575. But see International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of
Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991) (citing Professor Fletcher, supra note 1, and stating
that “standing is gauged by the specific common-law, statutory or constitutional claims that a
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that even where Congress has granted a cause of action to “any per-
son” complaining of agency violation of a nondiscretionary duty,
courts must ensure that plaintiffs have a constitutionally sufficient in-
terest, referred to by the phrase “injury in fact.”24  The existence of a
cause of action does not itself create a constitutionally sufficient in-
terest to satisfy Article III prerequisites.25
The Lujan majority looked for evidence of the plaintiffs’ actual
stake or interest in the environmental amenities allegedly threatened
by the government’s regulatory and funding choices that were no
longer influenced by Endangered Species Act consultations.26  Central
to the Court’s conclusions in Lujan was the plaintiffs’ lack of an on-
going physical presence in the foreign countries allegedly affected by
the United States’ project funding.27  The Court distinguished plain-
tiffs, who could only show an intent “some day” to return to the coun-
tries, from plaintiffs who could show that they lived “adjacent to the
site” about which consultation was allegedly required.28  The opinion
mocked several “nexus” theories offered by the plaintiffs to show
their connections to the areas where endangered species were alleg-
edly threatened.29
The majority’s critique of the plaintiffs’ nexus theories did not
question the sufficiency or constitutional adequacy of “aesthetic and
environmental” interests as a source of standing where made action-
able by positive law.  Instead, the question was whether these par-
party presents”); see also Fletcher,  supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575-76.
25. While Justices Kennedy and Souter were not willing to foreclose judicial recognition of
legislatively recognized injuries and interests without a common law analog, they too joined
most of Justice Scalia’s discussion of the need for judicial evaluation of the reality of a plaintiff’s
injury.  This core of current Article III standing doctrine was recently reemphasized in Raines v.
Byrd, where the Court denied standing to legislators who claimed that the Line Item Veto Act
unconstitutionally impaired their interests by “alter[ing] the legal and practical effects of [their]
votes.” 521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997).  The legislators also claimed that the Line Item Veto Act
harmed them by “divest[ing] [the legislators] of their constitutional role in the repeal of legisla-
tion” and by “alter[ing] the constitutional balance of powers.”  Id.  The Court, in the majority
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, confirmed that the core of standing doctrine requires that
the plaintiff have a “personal stake” in the alleged dispute apart from the legislators’ interests in
their legislative power and their concern with the constitutional separation of powers.  See id. at
818.  The Court denied standing.  See id.  The Court gave no apparent weight to the Line Item
Veto Act’s explicit conferral of a cause of action for legislators, instead heavily considering in-
ter-branch conflict and “attach[ing] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been
authorized to represent their Houses of Congress in this action.”  Id. at 827-28.
26. See 504 U.S. at 563-67.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 565-67.
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ticular plaintiffs had an actual connection to the areas and species al-
legedly threatened.30  In addition, the lack of plaintiffs’ physical
proximity to the areas in question led Justice Kennedy (in his concur-
rence joined by Justice Souter) to state that the plaintiffs did not de-
serve standing because they had not established that they were
“among the injured.”31  Justice Kennedy further implied that his out-
come would have been different had the plaintiffs planned to return
to the endangered species habitats: “it may seem trivial to require
that Mss. Kelly and Skilbred acquire airline tickets to the project
sites,” but without such tickets, the Court could not “assume that the
affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis.”32
That the Lujan Court knowingly declined to dismiss the constitu-
tional sufficiency of environmental and aesthetic interests for stand-
ing is further evident in its discussion of why “procedural injuries”
alleged by non-targets of regulation present standing difficulties.  The
entire concept of “procedural rights” is problematic under the Court’s
current standing framework.33  Nevertheless, the Lujan Court’s analy-
sis of the plaintiffs’ efforts to compel ESA agency consultations sheds
light on this article’s critique of how legislatively defined or created
interests influence standing analysis.  Justice Scalia stated for the
majority that, unlike direct regulatory targets who have standing be-
30. See id. at 564.
31. See id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
735 (1972)).
32. See id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in En-
vironmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (1996).
33. The “procedural rights” terminology is probably embedded now in standing jurispru-
dence, but many claims described as rooted in “procedural” irregularity are actually best viewed
as problematic for standing analysis because the alleged agency misstep occurs in the context of
intermediate government actions.  By intermediate actions, I mean actions short of the final step
in the decision-making process created by a relevant enabling act.  Part of a statutory sequence
of steps may be complete, but other decisions and actions must occur before final choices are
made and tangible results impacting a plaintiff follow.  Indeed, numerous standing disputes be-
fore the Court have turned on how the Court evaluated “chains of causation” or “causal links”
relevant to a plaintiff’s claimed injury.  See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 18, at 144-50 (discuss-
ing major Supreme Court cases evaluating whether plaintiffs’ claims were traceable and re-
dressable and analyzing the Court’s “tendency to manipulate the causation requirement to fur-
ther other goals”).  As Justice Blackmun (joined by Justice O’Connor) observed in his Lujan
dissent, “[m]ost governmental conduct can be classified as ‘procedural’.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 601
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  He further stated that “[i]n complex regulatory areas . . . Congress
often legislates . . . in procedural shades of gray . . . . [I]t sets forth substantive policy goals and
provides for their attainment by requiring Executive Branch officials to follow certain proce-
dures, for example, in the form of reporting, consultation, and certification requirements.”  Id.
at 602.  The line between substantive and procedural agency errors is unclear.  See William W.
Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article III Standing Analy-
sis after Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 793-98, 800-09, 811-23 (1997).
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cause they can show adverse impacts of the challenged government
action, non-targets have tougher standing criteria to meet.34  In the
context of suits initiated by non-targets (often referred to as regula-
tory beneficiaries), “causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on
the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the gov-
ernment action or inaction—and perhaps on the response of others as
well.”35  The Court expressed concern about plaintiffs “raising only a
generally available grievance” and claiming “only harm to his and
every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and
laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits
him than it does the public at large.”36  The Court rejected the propo-
sition that “the public interest in proper administration of the laws
(specifically, in agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily pre-
scribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a
statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or,
for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive con-
crete harm) to sue.”37  The existence of an agency procedural misstep,
even with broad citizen-suit conferral of a cause of action, was insuffi-
cient to create standing for the Lujan plaintiffs.
The Lujan Court did not, however, completely eliminate suits
based on government failures to follow legislatively prescribed proce-
dures.38  As noted in the preceding paragraph, the Court repeatedly
linked questions about the plaintiffs’ standing with assertions that
plaintiffs had no distinctive interest in the government action or
amenities threatened.39  Furthermore, in footnotes seven and eight,
the Court discussed  “procedural rights” standing criteria.40  In lan-
guage describing a hypothetical case that would give rise to a plain-
tiff’s standing, the Court described a type of plaintiff who would not
have to prove that a particular tangible injury would necessarily flow
34. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-63.  Justice Scalia stated that where an alleged injury results
from “allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is
needed.”  Id. at 562.  The Lujan majority opinion explained the “substantially more difficult”
standing criteria as resulting from courts’ difficulty in tracing and redressing injuries that stem
from “unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts . . . .”  See id.
(quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)).
35. Id at 562.
36. Id. at 573-74.
37. Id. at 576-77.  Raines similarly rejected standing for claimants lacking underlying inter-
ests apart from their interest in lawful government process.  See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
818.
38. See 504 U.S. at 577.
39. See, e.g., id. at 576-77.
40. See id. at 572-73.
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from a procedural failure or omission.41  The Court, as an example, re-
ferred to a failure of agencies to consult or analyze environmental
impacts as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”).42  The Court stated that “the person who has been ac-
corded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert
that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability
and immediacy.”43  The Court distinguished between plaintiffs living
“adjacent to a site,” who presumably have “procedural rights” stand-
ing, and plaintiffs “who live (and propose to live) at the other end of
the country” from the site involved in the regulatory dispute.44  The
Court stated that such an adjacent plaintiff has standing “even though
he cannot establish with any certainty that the [Environmental Impact
Statement analysis] will cause the license to be withheld or altered.”45
In this discussion, “injury in fact” analysis is explained as focusing
primarily on whether a litigant has a “concrete” interest that is
harmed or threatened by the allegedly illegal action subject to citizen
litigation.
Uncertainty about the contours of constitutional standing re-
quirements can also be attributed to Scalia’s redressability discussion
that garnered only a plurality opinion, as well as the concurring
opinion by Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Souter).  In his plural-
ity redressability discussion, Justice Scalia questioned whether a grant
of relief for the plaintiffs would redress their alleged injuries.46  He
pointed to several ways in which redress was uncertain.47  He ques-
tioned if ‘action agencies’ would choose to consult with the Secretary
(or with the Fish & Wildlife Service) even if the Court agreed with
the plaintiffs that the ESA was applicable to foreign projects.48  He
emphasized that ESA consultation is initiated by the action agencies,
41. See id. at 572 n.7.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.  As further stated in footnote eight of Lujan, “[w]e do not hold that an individual
cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are
designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his
standing.”  Id. at 573 n.8 (emphasis in original).  This language appears to call for analysis of the
importance of the alleged procedural irregularity at the level of examination of legislative pur-
pose and design—the issue is whether a plaintiff’s underlying “concrete” interest is of the type
“the procedures in question are designed to protect.”  Id.  For exploration of the role of physical
proximity and connection to standing analysis, see Farber, supra note 32.
46. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568-71.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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not by the Secretary.49  He also questioned if agencies not before the
Court would be obliged to follow “incidental legal determination[s]”
about the reach of the ESA.50  Finally, he questioned if funding of
foreign projects would continue anyway and whether, even without
United States funding, the threatening projects would continue.51  All
of these uncertainties exist anytime the alleged government illegality
concerns agency actions that are something less than the final certain
act affecting a party.  Importantly for this article’s analysis, his re-
dressability discussion did not garner a Court majority.
In their concurrence, Justices Kennedy and Souter were unwill-
ing to adopt the Scalia opinion’s “nexus” discussion.52  Justices Ken-
nedy and Souter also did not agree with the Scalia opinion’s emphasis
on a plaintiff’s need to show common law-like injury.53  Justices Ken-
nedy and Souter refused to join in the redressability portions of Jus-
tice Scalia’s opinion.54  In a somewhat obscure phrase, they “join[ed]
Part IV of the Court’s opinion with the following observations.”55  In
telling language converting ostensibly majority portions of Justice
Scalia’s opinion into a minority position, they stated that “Congress
has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and
I do not read the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary view.”56  For
Justices Kennedy and Souter (who, combined with Justice Stevens’
concurrence on other grounds and the dissenters, appear to make a
majority), Congress retains authority to articulate “new rights of ac-
tion that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition.”57
This dense discussion of procedural rights standing spawned substan-
tial lower court litigation and scholarly comment.58
For the purposes of this article, a few observations are signifi-
cant.  If, as Justice Scalia concedes, procedural improprieties can give
49. See id.
50. Id. at 569.
51. See id. at 571.
52. See id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 580.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 580.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 17.  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informa-
tional Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 613 (1999) (discussing Lujan in light
of the later Akins case’s more deferential and less restrictive approach to standing).  For a dis-
cussion of Akins, see infra Part I.D.
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rise to standing provided that a plaintiff has an actual stake in or
proximity to the area, and, further, aesthetic interests can suffice for
standing, then the focus must be on the reality of a plaintiff’s interest
in a dispute or case, not on the existence of some court-determined
harm to an underlying amenity such as endangered species habitats.
Such a reading of Lujan would be consistent with the Court’s ap-
proach in Sierra Club v. Morton59 as well as in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation,60 where the Court emphasized the importance of
environmental litigants having a connection to the area or amenity
alleged to be  affected by illegal action.  Similarly, the problem identi-
fied in Lujan with the “nexus” theories was not that United States
dollars would not have any possible influence on foreign land use de-
cisions affecting endangered species, but that the plaintiffs’ link to or
concern about those interests was difficult to discern.61  In the same
vein, Justice Kennedy’s ostensible concurrence further focused upon
legislatively defined interests or chains of causation rather than judi-
cially found injuries to an underlying amenity.62  
Furthermore, less demanding standing requirements for regula-
tory targets must mean that standing analysis focuses on the reality of
a litigant’s stake or “concrete interest” in a particular action that is
challenged, not on proof of harm to some amenity protected by a
statute.  For example, if an ESA prohibition on harming or killing en-
dangered species was applied against a dam builder to preclude
building of a dam, Justice Scalia states standing would be easily
found.63  In that setting, however, the challenged action by the gov-
ernment would not cause any harm to the amenity protected by a
statute.  Once again, to make sense of the Lujan majority opinion, the
key constitutional standing issue is the reality of a plaintiff’s interest
or stake in a particular action, as shaped by the underlying statutory
framework, not proof sufficient for an independent judicial finding
that the amenity protected by a statute was harmed.  To the extent
courts look for a congruence between a litigant’s interests and a stat-
ute’s goals, “zone of interest” prudential standing analysis remains
59. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
60. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
61. In the plurality redressability discussion, Justice Scalia called for such tracing of legal
mandates, law violations, and resulting effects.  He failed to garner majority support for this ap-
proach.  See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
62. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63. See id. at 572 n.7.
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relevant, but such “zone” analysis is not constitutional in nature and
can therefore be adjusted by legislative action.64
B.  Bennett v. Spear’s Problematic Mode of Analysis
Most of the Bennett v. Spear unanimous opinion further confirms
the view that standing analysis is not about independent judicial
findings of harms to a statutorily-protected amenity, but merely about
the reality of a litigants’ stake in a matter placed before the courts.65
Portions of its discussion, however, give litigants and courts at least a
toehold for arguments that courts have an even broader gatekeeping
role in standing analysis than indicated in Lujan.  In seeking to dis-
cern the Court’s competing standing strains of logic, Bennett is one of
the few cases that approaches standing in a manner arguably ex-
panding the judicial gatekeeping role.
The Bennett petitioners were users of waters who were economi-
cally adversely affected by a modification of water levels resulting
from measures designed to protect endangered species.66  The Court
easily found that these petitioners satisfied both Article III and “zone
of interests” standing criteria.67  The Article III discussion altogether
ignored any possible claim that the petitioners might have to establish
harm to an underlying amenity, versus harm to their own interests.68
The Court’s explanation for why these petitioners’ claims were re-
dressable presents some problems for the arguments in this article.
The Court did not state that remand alone to the relevant agency with
instruction to conform to the ESA would constitute redress.  Instead,
while the Court conceded that ESA biological opinions are only advi-
sory under the statute, the Court stated that an appropriately pre-
pared biological opinion on remand nevertheless would have an ac-
tual effect—or what the Court called a “coercive” or “virtually
64. See Buzbee, supra note 33, at 777-89 (discussing contours of “zone of interest” analysis
and implications of Bennett v. Spear).
65. For a more complete assessment of Bennett by this author, see id.; see also Sam Kalen,
Standing on its Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environ-
mental Cases, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1997).
66. See 520 U.S. 154, 157-61 (1997).
67. See id. at 166, 179.
68. The “zone of interests” discussion under both the ESA’s citizen-suit provisions and
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)-based claims analyzed the statute to discern if these
petitioners raised concerns of the sort intended to be litigated under the ESA.  The Court re-
solved this statutory and prudential question by finding that petitioners’ interests were relevant
to the ESA and hence they were within the statute’s “zone of interests,” whether their cause of
action was based on the ESA’s citizen-suit provision or on the APA.  See id. at 161-74.
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determinative effect.”69  The Court ultimately found that the biologi-
cal opinion and the ESA process had a sufficient effect on the action
agency to find the claims redressable.70
The Bennett Court did not, however, actually offer any explicit
analysis of the relative standing roles of the Court and Congress.  In-
stead, the Court’s mode of analysis indicated an approach inconsis-
tent with that advocated here.  As shown below, however, in the sub-
sequent Akins and Laidlaw cases, the Court took a notably different
and more deferential approach to standing analysis and offered more
explicit statements about why it felt such an approach was necessary.71
Bennett approached Article III standing in a potentially problematic
manner, but did not offer an explanation for its approach, as do these
subsequent cases.
C.  Steel Company’s Posture and Potential Expansion of Lujan
In Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,72 the
Court denied standing to environmentally-motivated plaintiffs who
sought imposition of penalties and limited injunctive relief against a
company that had failed to file forms required by a federal toxic sub-
stances information disclosure statute known as the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”).  The case was
problematic for the plaintiffs from the start due to the case’s posture.
The defendant had promptly filed the required forms once it received
notice of the plaintiffs’ intent to sue.73  There was thus no ongoing
violation of the statute when the complaint was filed.74  In addition,
the plaintiffs faced the problem of not seeking any potential damage
award, because the underlying statute dictated that any penalties
would go to the federal treasury.75  The Court, in a series of somewhat
disparate opinions focused on different constitutional and statutory
reasoning, found that plaintiffs lacked standing due to a lack of re-
dressability.  There was no redressability because penalties would not
flow to the plaintiffs, and because injunctive relief requiring legal
69. See id. at 169-70.
70. See id. at 170-71.
71. See infra Part I.D.
72. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
73. See id. at 88.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 106.
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compliance was not necessary given the company’s belated, but pre-
complaint, observance of EPCRA.76
Article III standing inquiries in the Steel Company majority
opinion thus primarily focused on redressability issues.  The opinion
also contains, however, brief language shedding additional light on
the relative roles of courts and Congress in assessing so-called “injury
in fact” questions.77  The Court briefly mentioned the lack of report-
ing as relevant to standing based not on some independent judicial
weighing of the information’s importance, but in a way that wrapped
statutory interests and “injury” together.  “We have not had occasion
to decide whether being deprived of information that is supposed to
be disclosed under EPCRA—or at least being deprived of it when
one has a particular plan for its use—is a concrete injury in fact that
satisfies Article III.”78  The Court then turned to its redressability
analysis.  This brief passage, however, appears yet again to call for
analysis of the plaintiff’s actual interest in the underlying dispute, but
does not, for example, look for analysis of whether the absence of this
information would lead to some other judicially recognized harm to
an underlying interest completely independent of Congress’s statu-
tory framework.
The Court’s redressability analysis is concededly in tension with
this article’s thesis, especially in its dismissal of ways penalties created
by Congress might further statutory ends and thereby provide re-
dress.79  Much of the opinion, however, turns on its unusual posture of
a case brought completely after a defendant had cured its statutory
violation and no basis remained for believing a future violation was
likely.  Furthermore, the recent Laidlaw decision largely resolves
questions about Steel Company’s reach in ways limiting the courts’
standing gatekeeping role.
D.  The Akins and Laidlaw Retreat from Lujan
Both Akins and Laidlaw adopted a standing approach that
overtly gave paramount importance to legislative judgments and the
statutory universe.  Neither case reflected independent judicial as-
sessment of the existence of a sufficient injury or redressability that
was divorced from the underlying statutory frameworks.  The Akins
Court’s focus on the underlying statute for purposes of standing
76. See id. at 101-09.
77. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 .
78. Id. at 105.
79. See id. at 105-09.
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analysis has led Professor Sunstein to view Akins as a major standing
case, pulling an unsound line of cases back onto a sound footing.80
In both Akins and Laidlaw, the Court retained the core Lujan as-
sessment of whether the plaintiff had an actual stake or interest in the
litigated matter.
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins,81 the respondent’s
complaint alleged that the FEC had failed to require a lobbying group
to disclose legally required information in accordance with the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971.82  The Court found that the re-
spondents satisfied both prudential and Article III standing require-
ments.83  The Court retained the “injury in fact” analysis prong,
characterizing it as a “requirement that helps assure that courts will
not ‘pass upon . . . abstract, intellectual problems,’ but adjudicate
‘concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries.”84  The Court ad-
dressed this Article III question by linking its analysis of the petition-
ers’ interests with interests made legally actionable by the statute:  the
“‘injury in fact’ that respondents have suffered consists of their in-
ability to obtain information . . . the statute requires that AIPAC
make public.”85  The Court stated that a plaintiff suffers an “injury in
fact” when “the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be
publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.”86  The Court declined to
follow the line of taxpayer standing cases requiring a “logical nexus”
between the “status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated.”87  These cases were inapposite, in the Court’s view, because in
Akins “there is a statute which . . . does seek to protect individuals
such as respondents from the kind of harm they say they have suf-
fered . . . .”88  Standing analysis was thus approached in a manner that
explicitly wrapped this Article III constitutional question with judicial
deference to the statutory universe of interests and incentives created
by the legislature.
80. See Sunstein, supra note 58.
81. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
82. See id. at 19-26.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 20 (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing)).
85. Id. at 21.
86. Id. (citing Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)).
87. Id. at 22 (citing as inapposite to the Akins setting, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102
(1968)).
88. Id.
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Furthermore, the Akins Court’s redressability discussion avoided
the substantial judicial role apparently envisioned (or at least actually
exercised) in Bennett.  Rather than looking for some near-certain tan-
gible changed result that would flow from the FEC’s appropriate ex-
ercise of its authority on remand, the Court said that the agency on
remand could reach an identical result, but that the respondent’s
claim was nevertheless redressable and traceable.89  “[T]he courts . . .
can ‘redress’ respondents’ ‘injury in fact’” and find “causation” even
though the courts “cannot know” that the FEC would exercise its dis-
cretion in the way desired by respondents.90  “Agencies often have
discretion about whether or not to take a particular action.  Yet those
adversely affected by discretionary agency action generally have
standing to complain that the agency based its decision upon an im-
proper legal ground.”91  Hence, the Akins Court made agency con-
formity with legally required substance and process the touchstone
for finding standing causation and redressability, not separate inde-
pendent judicial assessment that the statutorily required criteria or
process mattered.92
Laidlaw further continued the Court’s overt return to giving the
statutory universe a prominent, if not paramount role, in standing
analysis.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
Inc. was in many respects a run-of-the-mill Clean Water Act violation
case that was complicated by the defendant’s apparent belated, post-
complaint curing of the cause of its permit violations.93  The court of
appeals below questioned the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ environ-
mental interests in the river into which the defendant had discharged,
and it consequently found the case required dismissal, primarily on
mootness grounds, once the defendant had cured its violations and
the causes of those violations.94  The Laidlaw Court rejected the lower
court’s approach and found that the plaintiffs had standing.95  The
posture of the case was significant to its outcome; in particular, the
Court found compelling the existence of numerous post-complaint
permit violations.96
89. See id. at 25.
90. Id. at 24-26.
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id. at 25-26.
93. 528 U.S. 167, 178-79 (2000).
94. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc. 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th
Cir. 1998).
95. See 528 U.S. at 173-74.
96. See id. at 176-78.
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The Laidlaw Court emphatically rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment and the appellate court’s approach that had analyzed “injury in
fact” by examining whether the plaintiffs could establish harm to the
excessively polluted river that in turn injured the plaintiffs.97  Instead,
the seven justice majority stated that “[t]he relevant showing for pur-
poses of Article III standing, however, is not injury to the environ-
ment but injury to the plaintiff.”98  The Court justified this focus on
the plaintiff’s injury and on reasons courts cannot require additional
proof of environmental harm by once again emphasizing the statutory
framework:  “[t]o insist upon the former [injury to the environment]
rather than the latter as part of the standing inquiry . . . is to raise the
standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success on the
merits alleging noncompliance with a [Clean Water Act] permit.”99
The plaintiffs’ somewhat weakly stated links to the polluted river
were sufficient for Article III “injury in fact”:  “environmental plain-
tiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the
affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recrea-
tional values of the areas will be lessened’ by the challenged activ-
ity.”100  The Court’s emphasis was on the plaintiffs’ stated actual inter-
ests in the environmental amenity protected by statute.
In portions of the Laidlaw opinion less salient to this article, the
Court substantially cut back on the Steel Company redressabil-
ity/deterrence discussion, finding that (at least with the post-
complaint permit violations), penalties can serve a deterrent func-
tion.101  The Court concluded that even with subsequent rectification
of the underlying causes of the permit violations, plaintiffs’ claim
could be held redressable.102  The Court’s explanation for why these
penalties sufficed to preserve the plaintiffs’ standing and not render
the case moot was again largely based on the Court’s deference to
legislative judgment.  “Whether proscribed conduct is to be deterred
[by a range of potential sanctions] is a matter within the legislature’s
97. See id. at 180-88.
98. Id. at 181.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972), and further citing
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-63, which stated that “the desire to use or ob-
serve an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest
for purposes of standing.”).
101. See id. at 187-88.
102. See id. at 193-94 (remanding for further examination of mootness and redressability in
light of allegations that the problem was cured, that the plant was now closed, but that the per-
mit violator still had a active CWA permit).
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range of choice.”103  The Court continued, “[t]his congressional de-
termination [about the deterrent effect of penalties] warrants judicial
attention and respect.”104  It therefore found, based substantially on
notions of deference to legislative judgments, that penalties would
both serve to abate current violations and prevent future ones.105
Hence, Laidlaw, Sierra Club v. Morton,106 Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation107 and the Lujan opinion discussed at length here
(Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife), all share a standing approach that
calls for analysis of a litigant’s connection to an amenity protected or
regulated by a statute’s goals and process, or a litigant’s stake in ac-
tions taken by regulators or regulated entities under the statutory
framework.  None of these cases (apart from language by Justice
Scalia in Lujan that lacks majority support) looks for allegations suf-
ficient to prove, either under the specific facts alleged or under the
general statutory framework, that the amenity subject to the statutory
framework (for example, receiving waters) would actually be tangibly
affected in a different way if the alleged illegalities were corrected.
Akins and Laidlaw thus do much to return standing analysis to a
sounder footing that gives appropriate weight to legislative judg-
ments, with a corresponding affirmation that the courts have a lesser
independent standing analysis role than was threatened by broad
readings of Lujan and Bennett.  Laidlaw, in particular, provides a
sound framework, but the opinion perhaps missed a key opportunity
to explain why judicial deference to legislative judgments remains
important to standing analysis, even if courts must continue to ensure
a plaintiff has a real “stake” in federal litigation.  An analysis of the
line of Supreme Court standing cases since Lujan makes readily ap-
parent the erroneously expansive reading given to Lujan by the
courts of appeals in Magnesium Elektron and in the initial panel deci-
sion in Gaston.  After critiquing these two appellate cases and the re-
103. Id. at 187 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940)).
104. Id. at 185.
105. See id. at 185-89.  See also Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1861-66.  The Vermont Agency qui tam decision provided little dis-
cussion shedding light on how the “statutory universe” of goals and procedures influences
standing analysis.  Nonetheless, by rejecting the sufficiency of a bounty reward to justify stand-
ing, the Court yet again confirmed that mere conferral of a cause of action does not suffice to
create standing.  The Court failed to explain why its “assignee” theory of whistleblower standing
sustained in this case would not also justify environmental “citizen suit” standing.  See also supra
note 8.
106. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see also text accompanying note 59.
107. 497 U.S. 871 (1990); see also text accompanying note 60.
II - STANDING AND THE STATUTORY UNIVERSE - BUZBEE.DOC 05/09/01  1:55 PM
 Spring 2001] STANDING AND THE STATUTORY UNIVERSE 267
cent en banc reversal of the original Gaston panel decision, this article
turns to fleshing out the missing explanatory step in Laidlaw.
E.  Lujan-plus:  The Errors of Magnesium Elektron and Gaston
Both the Third and Fourth Circuits’ opinions on environmental
standing in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Magnesium Elektron, Inc.108 and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston
Copper Recycling Corp.109 can be characterized in fairly simple terms,
emphasizing their factual and analytical commonalities.  These opin-
ions preceded the Supreme Court’s ruling in Laidlaw, but even with-
out Laidlaw’s confirmation that their analysis would be rejected by
the Supreme Court, these cases constituted an unsound expansion of
Lujan.  The more recent en banc Gaston opinion, issued shortly after
the Supreme Court’s Laidlaw decision, largely hews to the logic and
implications of Laidlaw reviewed above.
Both cases involved conceded violations of the Clean Water Act
that resulted in litigated citizen suits.  In each case, defendants sought
to defeat the plaintiffs’ standing by arguing that due to the inability of
the plaintiffs to trace the defendants’ permit violations to particular
discernible degradations of the excessively polluted receiving waters,
the plaintiffs could not show an injury in fact that was traceable or re-
dressable.110  In essence, these pre-Laidlaw opinions revealed a mode
of standing analysis in which the courts looked for evidence from
which they could independently determine that legal violations made
actionable by Congress actually resulted in what the courts found to
be tangible “touch and feel” harm.111
The Magnesium Elektron court acknowledged that the CWA ex-
plicitly states that its purpose is to “restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”112  The
court rejected the environmental plaintiffs’ argument that this statu-
tory goal allowed plaintiffs to sue to maintain a river’s “pristine
state.”113  The court saw itself as having to determine independently if
there was “actual or threatened injury” to the environment, and, in
108. 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
109. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
110. See 123 F.3d at 116; 179 F.3d at 113.
111. See 179 F.3d at 120 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s approach as
unnecessarily raising the bar for proof of injury in fact).
112. 123 F.3d at 119.
113. Id. at 120.
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turn, to these plaintiffs.114  The court acknowledged that in Lujan the
plaintiffs “had no plausible connection to the situs of the injury,”
while plaintiffs before the Magnesium Elektron court “no doubt . . .
use[d] the Delaware River.”115  Nevertheless, again and again, the
Court stated that it must find on its own the presence of “actual, tan-
gible injury to the River or its surroundings,” even where plaintiffs
were users of the River that was receiving illegal amounts of pollution
and where Congress had made such violations actionable by citi-
zens.116  The court looked for proof of “increases in the River’s salin-
ity, or a decrease in the number of fish, or any other negative change
in the River’s ecosystem.”117  The court went so far as to applaud
some of the defendant’s permit violations, stating that some violations
“actually benefitted the Creek’s ecosystem” by adding nutrients to an
area that was not “nutrient rich.”118
In short, for the Magnesium Elektron court, the statute’s explicit
goal of “chemical, physical and biological integrity” was insufficient
to make actionable pollution that by definition interfered with that
integrity, albeit in ways difficult to establish as tangible harms.119  The
court approached the CWA with what is best viewed as the “fish tank
environmentalist view.”  Regardless of the statute’s “integrity” goal,
under which rivers and creeks would naturally vary widely in their
suitability for a particular species’ habitat, the court decided it could
measure benefit and harm on its own.120  If added nutrients would
render a particular portion of a river or creek a better fish tank, or a
better environment for flourishing of other species, then by definition
(according to the court), this was no harm at all.121  Different legisla-
tive judgments or goals about “biological integrity,” let alone differ-
ent “integrity” goals that might be preferred by ecologists, were ir-
relevant to the Magnesium Elektron court’s analysis.  The court
similarly found that alleged informational harms resulting from fail-
114. See id.  For a critique of concepts of causation and a discussion of Magnesium Elektron,
see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1307, 1333-35 (1998).
115. 123 F.3d at 120.
116. Id. at 121.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 123.
119. See id. at 120.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 123.
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ures to report as required by the CWA could not be the subject of
citizen suits absent underlying environmental harm.122
The Fourth Circuit’s original panel opinion in Gaston was argua-
bly even more problematic than that in Magnesium Elektron.  The
Gaston court again faced a case with conceded CWA violations, but
this time with plaintiffs alleging not only environmental and aesthetic
impairments, but also economic impairments to their real property
and businesses using the waters, as perceived economic values
dropped in response to public revelation of the excessive pollution in
the area waters.123  Furthermore, testing of the excessive pollution at
issue for toxicity concededly showed “observable effects” on test or-
ganisms.124  The court, however, looked for proof that particular per-
mit violations could be traced to particular harms to the receiving wa-
ters.125  In the absence of such proof, the court found that the plaintiffs
could not actually have suffered any injury in fact that was traceable
to the defendant.126  Judge Wilkinson, in dissent, characterized the
majority as “encroach[ing] on congressional authority” by requiring
“evidence that [the court majority] can touch and feel.”127
In addition to ignoring the legislative goal and judgment that
ecological “integrity” matters, both of these cases also failed to con-
sider the repercussions if several polluters in aggregate could add ille-
gal amounts of pollution with impunity from citizen suits.  Further-
more, the courts both went well beyond Lujan in looking for “touch
and feel” evidence of environmental harms even for plaintiffs who,
unlike those in Lujan, were actual residents and users of areas in the
vicinity of the excessively polluted waters.  These cases preceded
Laidlaw, but they are undoubtedly in significant tension with Laid-
law’s statement that the “relevant showing for purposes of Article III
standing, however, is not injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff.”128
The en banc Fourth Circuit reversal of the pre-Laidlaw Gaston
opinion approached standing in a manner much more deferential to
congressional judgments and choices evident in the Clean Water
Act’s statutory framework.  The unanimous Fourth Circuit empha-
122. See id. at 123-24.
123. See Gaston, 179 F.3d at 110.
124. See id. at 111.
125. See id. at 113-14.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 120 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
128. 528 U.S. at 181.
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sized that a plaintiff’s “sufficient personal stake” presented in a “con-
crete factual context” is the essence of standing analysis.129  The
courts’ critical function in standing is to ensure the plaintiff is “among
the injured,” so as to “filter the truly afflicted from the abstractly dis-
tressed.”130  The en banc court explicitly addressed the separation of
powers implications of a contrary standing approach that would allow
courts to use standing frameworks to close courthouse doors where
Congress intended that they be open.  Noting the strict liability
scheme under the CWA, the court stated that courts cannot “creat[e]
evidentiary barriers to standing that the Constitution does not require
and Congress has not embraced.  In fact, the legislative branch has in-
vited precisely the type of suit brought by [plaintiffs].  The judicial
branch is not at liberty to impede its resolution on the merits.”131  The
court easily found that the plaintiffs were not “roving environmental
ombudsm[e]n” but were easily “differentiate[d] . . . from the general
public.”132  The court rejected any requirement of proof of harm to the
illegally polluted amenities, quoting Laidlaw’s key statement that
standing is not about “injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff.”133  The court concluded that “[t]his case illustrates at heart
the importance of judicial restraint” and hence refused to “thwart
congressional intent” by requiring a type of proof not required by
Congress.134
The concurring opinions largely conceded that the court’s result
was required by Laidlaw.135  These concurrences are only worthy of
note in their assertion that an opposite result would have been re-
quired under pre-Laidlaw cases and in their assertion that Laidlaw
constituted a “sea change in constitutional standing principles.”136  In
his concurrence, Judge Luttig characterized the majority opinion as
reflecting a “comfortable, but mistaken, assumption that the Supreme
Court’s decisions prior to Laidlaw themselves dictated the conclu-
129. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 153 (2000).
130. Id. at 153-54.
131. Id. at 156.
132. Id. at 157.
133. Id. at 160-61 (quoting Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181).  The Gaston en banc court continued
by stating that to “have standing hinge on anything more in a Clean Water Act case would ne-
cessitate the litigation of complicated issues of scientific fact that are entirely collateral to the
question Congress wished resolved—namely, whether a defendant has exceeded its permit lim-
its.”  Id. at 162.
134. Id. at 163.
135. See id. at 164-65.
136. Id. at 164 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
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sion” of the en banc court.137  As suggested above in this article’s
analysis of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence from Lujan to
the present, I believe that the concurring judges’ assertions are in er-
ror.
The parts below further explain why the standing approach ar-
ticulated in Laidlaw and further fleshed out in the Fourth Circuit’s
Gaston en banc opinion is appropriate and necessary in light of legis-
lative supremacy values and the relative institutional competence of
courts and legislatures to make judgments about harms and regula-
tory ends and means.
II.  LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY AND THE STANDING FRAMEWORK
Congressionally enacted statutes undoubtedly range from the
purely symbolic, to the ineffective, to (at least on occasion) the effec-
tive.138  Legislative goals also vary widely and are often difficult to dis-
cern.  From the public choice perspective, most laws will reflect legis-
lator or presidential attempts to attract votes or campaign
contributions, as well as special interest rent seeking.139  Laws also re-
sult from moments of political or societal ferment that lead to unusual
degrees of public interest and legislator attention to that heightened
citizen interest.140  Public-spirited or perhaps opportunistic “political
entrepreneurs” will sometimes seize on public interest or even lead
the public in making an incipient societal issue worthy of legislative
attention.141
137. Id. at 165 (Luttig, J., concurring); see also id. (Hamilton, J., concurring) (criticizing how
Laidlaw has “unnecessarily opened the standing floodgates”).
138. See generally John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
233 (1990).
139. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991)
(describing and critiquing public choice theories of law and politics); FRED S. MCCHESNEY,
MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997)
(developing a strong public choice-based critique of legislators’ monetary motivations for pro-
posing legislative change); see also DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION (1974) (discussing ways legislators act to enhance their reelection prospects).
140. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment Ex-
planations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29 (1998) (sug-
gesting that despite interest group theory predictions, strong citizen interest in the environment
could explain first generation federal environmental laws).
141. For a discussion of entrepreneurial politics explanations of environmental laws, see
William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68
FORD. L. REV. 57, 77-91, 128-31 (1999); E. Donald Elliott, et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-29 (1985);
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 65-70
(1992).
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Environmental laws share and reflect this whole range of poten-
tial traits, from laws containing many provisions and goals that are lit-
tle more than symbolic, to laws containing special interest-benefitting
exceptions, to laws that have created massive societal benefits and
costs.  Based on recent regulatory reform debates that often focused
on environmental laws, United States environmental statutes and
their associated regulations and implementation actions have had
massive effects on virtually all aspects of life in this country.142  Any
proposal to change the procedural requirements or substance of envi-
ronmental laws leads to national political battles, as well as consider-
able associated campaigning and contribution activity by industry and
environmental not-for-profits.  These laws may be imprudently cost-
ineffective to their critics or insufficiently rigorous to their supporters
seeking a cleaner environment.  However, unless one believes that
politicians, industry, and environmental groups all engage in costly
political activity merely for sport, it is logical to assume that these
laws’ substantive goals and procedural devices have real world effects.
Indeed, one of the undisputed conclusions of political and academic
critiques of efforts to add cost-benefit analysis requirements to envi-
ronmental and risk regulation is that United States regulatory re-
gimes have substantial aggregate effects.143
Discerning these laws’ effects on the much smaller scale of indi-
vidual violations of particular permits is far less easy.  The targets of
regulation make compliance decisions based on their sense of obliga-
tion to comply with the laws, their evaluation of compliance costs and
the likelihood particular conduct will result in sanctionable violations,
their evaluation of how pollution might result in adverse market
evaluations or nuisance liability, and their views of how their workers
and neighbors will react to their compliance record.144  Many pollution
permit violations will be difficult if not impossible to trace to particu-
142.  See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress,
Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247 (1996).
143. See MCGARITY, supra note 142.  For a review of the history and implications of efforts
of the 104th Congress to enact a single metastatutory regulatory reform law, including a review
of underlying arguments for such legislation and a critique of those arguments, see William W.
Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle:  The “Legislative Mirage” of Single-Statute
Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 299-312, 313-17 (1996).
144. For a discussion of the U.S. EPA’s enforcement history, see JOEL A. MINTZ,
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (1995).  For a more general
discussion of regulatory enforcement policy and incentives, see EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT
A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS
(1982).
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lar environmental harms.  The faster and larger the receiving waters
under the Clean Water Act, or the receiving air under the Clean Air
Act, the more difficulty plaintiffs would have in proving the existence
of resulting harms or pollution residues.
Hence, for litigants and courts seeking to assess the effects of
particular compliance records under any regulatory regime, especially
in areas such as environmental law or other bodies of risk regulation,
confident assessment is difficult.  The aggregate monetary and be-
havior-modifying effects of such laws are substantial, influencing lev-
els of environmental pollution, government implementation and en-
forcement, citizen monitoring and litigation, and private sector
compliance and pollution control efforts.145  However, the ways par-
ticular litigation choices regarding permit violations will ripple across
the regulatory terrain and modify stakeholder behavior is hard to dis-
cern.  Nevertheless, each statute’s regulatory framework, including
both goals and means, reflects legislative judgments and changes in-
centives and probabilities that would have existed in the absence of
such a statutory universe.146
A.  Standing, Statutory Purpose, and the Layers of Political Judgment
One of the strange attributes of the standing jurisprudence of
Justice Scalia is the considerable tension between his approaches to
statutory interpretation and his rhetoric and rulings regarding citizen-
suit standing.  Echoing earlier scholarly suggestions of Judges Posner
and Easterbrook,147 Justice Scalia scorns “purposive” modes of statu-
tory interpretation that try to resolve tough interpretive questions by
looking at a statute’s general purposes and merely seeking to further
them.  For Justice Scalia, the question is how far the legislature went
in seeking to achieve a particular goal and by what means it sought to
achieve that end:  “Deduction from the ‘broad purpose’ of a statute
begs the question if it is used to decide by what means (and hence to
145. For further analysis of reasons courts lack the institutional competence to assess the
general effects of a regulatory regime or to assess on a case-specific basis the effects of a par-
ticular alleged legal violation, see infra Part II.A.
146. See Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?, supra note 2 (characterizing most statuto-
rily required procedures as changing incentives and probabilities rather than guaranteeing out-
comes).
147. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation–In the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading
of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982).
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what length) Congress pursued that purpose.”148  Consistent with eco-
nomic views of the law emphasizing that procedural burdens and op-
tions influence regulatory outcomes, at least at the margins, Justice
Scalia has noted the importance of congressional procedural devices
to regulatory results:  “one of the functions of procedure is to limit
power—not just the power to be unfair, but the power to act in a po-
litical mode, or the power to act at all . . . . The degrees of activism
and of political decision which the Congress expects from (or, more
precisely, which the legislative struggle finally induces its divergent
factions to accord to) [various agencies] may vary enormously–and so
will the procedures which reflect those expectations.”149
As reflected in these quotes, Justice Scalia has shown in other
contexts a sensitivity to how legislative goals can be shaped and lim-
ited by procedural devices.  Implicit in these statements is also at least
a weak form of a legislative supremacy argument.  A judiciary that
seeks to enforce the substantive and procedural choices of the legisla-
ture, but avoids expanding on particular preferred statutory purposes
or changing the procedural devices chosen, is showing fealty to the
discernible legislative bargain manifest in a statute.150
In his standing jurisprudence, however, Justice Scalia reaches out
and not only undercuts the citizen-suit device, one of Congress’s cho-
sen procedural means to further legislative ends, but also fails to ac-
knowledge the multiple layers of politically accountable legislative
and regulatory judgments that must precede any meritorious citizen-
suit litigation.151  No citizen plaintiff has even a chance of success on
148. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 726
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee:  the APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 404-08 (1979); see also PETER STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND
BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 359-60 (9th ed. 1995) (excerpting and discussing Vermont Yan-
kee).
150. In other contexts, Justice Scalia has noted the importance of legislative supremacy.
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183
(1989) (stating “[e]ven where a particular area is quite susceptible of clear and definite rules, we
judges cannot create them out of whole cloth, but must find some basis for them in the text that
Congress or the Constitution has provided”).  For a critique of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence
and views on legislative supremacy, see William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice
Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1164, 1167 (1992) (referring
to Justice Scalia’s view that the legislature is “the preferred source of law” and stating that un-
der his view judges cannot make law because they “lack electoral authority”).
151. By referring to “political judgments” made manifest in statutes, implementing regula-
tions, and ultimately permits, this article is not asserting that some anthropomorphized legisla-
ture with a common view ever actually exists.  As well developed in both public choice literature
and in “positive political theory,” the most one can claim is that political actors have numerous
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the merits unless a citizen suit builds off of just the kind of political
judgments that Justice Scalia elsewhere argues deserve judicial re-
spect.  These layers of political judgment include, in most contexts, at
least the following conditions precedent to citizen litigation.
If the citizen litigation is against a government agency for failures
to comply with statutory mandates, such suits, at a minimum, must be
rooted in an identifiable tension between a substantive or procedural
statutory requirement and the alleged government illegality.  Such a
suit must also be brought in accordance with the terms of the enabling
act or through Administrative Procedure Act (APA) causes of action.
Citizen-suit provisions in environmental law contain several prerequi-
sites to pursuing such litigation, including advance notice to the de-
fendant as well as to other layers of government involved in that stat-
ute’s enforcement.152  In light of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council’s153 generally deferential framework for ju-
dicial review of agency statutory interpretations, a citizen suit or
APA-based claim alleging an erroneous agency statutory interpreta-
tion is unlikely to succeed unless the agency has acted in a manner
clearly inconsistent with statutory treatment of the “precise question
at issue.”154
goals and that shifting coalitions will on occasion coalesce to create majorities or supermajori-
ties sufficient to enact legislation or promulgate implementing regulations.  The resulting statu-
tory texts, regulations and permits constitute authoritative law in the forms recognized under
our legal system.  By passing through the crucible of these various types of political and judi-
cially reviewable steps, they are derived from a concededly flawed but nevertheless politically
representative process.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Sec-
tion 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overrul-
ing Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congres-
sional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1990); Matthew D. McCubbins, et al.,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); McNollgast, Positive Canons:  The Role of Legislative
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).  See also William W. Buzbee, The
One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 171 (2000) (building on
positive political theory approaches to criticize statutory interpretation methods relying on in-
terstatutory language comparisons).  For a symposium exploring the implications and attributes
of Positive Political Theory, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political
Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L J. 457 (1992).  Professors Farber and Frickey define Positive
Political Theory (“PPT”) as “non-normative, rational-choice theories of political institutions.”
Id. at 462.  PPT scholarship and theories focus upon how institutional settings influence political
process and outcomes.  See id. at 460-62.
152. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 18, at 1077-78.
153. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
154. See id. at 842-43.  For discussions of how Chevron deference is applied, see Michael
Herz, Deference Running Riot:  Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking under Chevron, 6
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,
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Where a suit is brought against a defendant violating a permit,
many additional layers of political judgment underlie the citizen suit.
In most environmental laws, particularly in the Clean Air and Water
Acts, Congress first requires the EPA to measure the regulated indus-
try’s pollution control capabilities and, measured against additional
benchmarks such as the nature of the pollutant, costs and benefits,
the age of pollution sources, and possibly the environment receiving
the pollution, determine presumptive required levels of pollution con-
trol for that category of polluter.155  As Professor Farber recently ex-
plored, slippage from this goal of regulatory uniformity often occurs
as one moves down the layers of delegated authority that translate
regulatory standards into actual permit requirements.156  Federal en-
forcers often hand over authority to state agencies, which then im-
plement and enforce federal laws and regulations either to supplant
the federal enforcer or as a condition for receipt of federal condi-
tional federal spending.157  States, in turn, fit those federal require-
ments into the body of state law and regulations and turn to subordi-
nate state or local officials who engage in permit negotiations with
individual sources.158  Those permitting proceedings are themselves
subject to further opportunities for public input as permit details are
hammered out.159  Illegality in the promulgation of federal regulations,
state implementation of federally delegated programs, and permit
procedures and substance, all can give rise to potential litigation
should legislatively and administratively required substantive or pro-
cedural requirements be disregarded.
Only after all of these layers of political judgment have been ex-
ercised does a permitted polluter even become vulnerable to citizen
suits for permit violations.  All a citizen suit for a permit violation can
101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
155. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 83.  For Professor Krier’s critical assessment of these “uniform” regulatory standards, see
James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System–and
Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995); James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality
Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974).
156. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Com-
pliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999).
157. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183, 1193-1219 (1995) (analyzing state-federal interactions under delegated program
structures in the Clean Air Act).
158. See id.
159. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735 F.
Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (discussing public notice requirements under federal law and
“comparable” state laws).
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do is seek to enforce the end result of these layers of political judg-
ment.160  Furthermore, only politically authorized penalties or injunc-
tive relief can be obtained by a successful citizen litigant.  Each of
these layers of political judgment has already allowed for some slip-
page and dovetailing of federal goals to the particular priorities of
each state and the capacities of each permitted pollution source.
Given these layers of politically accountable decisions and Jus-
tice Scalia’s pre-Supreme Court immersion in the nuances of adminis-
trative law structures, one might expect his standing opinions to grap-
ple with the implications of the many procedural and substantive
political judgments that must precede any citizen suit.  Instead, one
finds rhetoric of mockery, judicial questioning of plaintiffs’ motives,
and second-guessing of the implicit legislative judgments in these
regulatory statutes that compliance with permits, associated judg-
ments in regulations and required process will make a difference.  He
neglects the reality of these many layers of politically accountable
judgments that originate in legislative choices made law in statutes.
His rhetoric appears to assume that citizens bringing such litigation
are exercising only their own policy preferences.
In Lujan, for example, he mocks the reality of the plaintiffs’ al-
leged connections to sites and endangered species that would be fur-
ther threatened by United States funds.161  In his plurality discussion
of redressability, he questions if compliance with the Endangered
Species Act’s required process would matter anyway.162  In Laidlaw,
Justice Scalia partly explains his dissent based on his empirical as-
sessment (based on a law review article’s assertions) that “the avail-
ability of civil penalties vastly disproportionate to the individual in-
jury gives citizen plaintiffs massive bargaining power—which is often
used to achieve settlements requiring the defendant to support envi-
ronmental projects of the plaintiffs’ choosing.”163  A scholarly re-
sponse to the multiple layers of judicial second-guessing here is diffi-
cult.  How does he know the civil penalties are disproportionate?  If
so, is that view of legislative choices of sanctions relevant to the
Court’s review of a plaintiff’s standing?  On what empirical data does
160. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir.
1993) (concluding that the Clean Water Act “permit shield” barred a citizen suit challenging
discharges disclosed by a polluter but not made part of the polluter’s pollution parameters ad-
dressed by its permit).
161. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
162. See id. at 568.
163. 528 U.S. 167, 209-10 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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he conclude that plaintiffs have massive bargaining power?  Does that
bargaining power exist (if at all) apart from the legal structures and
many political judgments that wind their way down into particular
permits?  On what basis does Justice Scalia make the contestable as-
sertion that environmental projects are forced upon reluctant defen-
dants rather than embraced as a more palatable means to soften po-
tential sanctions?164  He calls plaintiffs suing under a congressionally
created cause of action a “self-appointed mini-EPA.”165  In Laidlaw,
he also calls for a standing framework that would require litigants to
establish that in the particular factual setting of their case, a court’s
intervention would actually deter harms to these particular plaintiffs,
rather than focusing on the incentives created by the regulatory
framework violated by the defendant.166
In the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in the Steel Company
case, Justice Scalia’s rhetoric and assumptions about litigants’ motiva-
tions are even more remarkable.167  He refers to the plaintiffs as moti-
vated by desire for “psychic satisfaction.”168  Responding to Justice
Stevens’ dissent, he characterizes plaintiffs’ claim as lacking the requi-
site request for tangible relief and further opines on plaintiffs’ motiva-
tions:  such suits are “most often inspired by the psychological smart
of perceived official injustice, or by the government-policy prefer-
ences of political activists.”169  This statement is notable for its utter
lack of acknowledgement that, whatever Justice Scalia’s views of the
environmental laws, such plaintiffs could not even begin such a case,
let alone succeed on the merits, unless these plaintiffs’ claims ac-
corded with all of the preceding political judgments converted into
law and made actionable.  If the legislature’s declarations are su-
preme under our system of government, then the harshest criticism
one can level against such citizen litigants is that their policy prefer-
164. See David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement Reform:
The Case of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181.
165. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 209.
166. Justice Scalia stated in his dissent that plaintiffs can only show deterrence if they can
show “the marginal increase in Laidlaw’s fear of future penalties that will be achieved by adding
federal penalties for Laidlaw’s past conduct.”  Id. at 208 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He argued
standing should have been denied because “it is entirely speculative whether it will make the
difference between these plaintiffs’ suffering injury in the future and plaintiffs’ going un-
harmed.”  Id.  Despite these plaintiffs’ connection to the illegally polluted areas and Congress’
statutory framework, Justice Scalia referred to plaintiffs’ deterrence argument as “entirely far-
fetched” and “speculative.”  See id.
167. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 104.
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ences are in accord with those made into statutory law and made ac-
tionable through numerous judicially-reviewable regulatory steps that
ultimately translate into a permit-based scheme.
The appellate decisions in Magnesium Elektron and the pre-
Laidlaw opinion in Gaston are extensions of the strains of logic and
approach of Justice Scalia in Lujan and Steel Company, as well as in
his dissent in Laidlaw.  If one examines the pre-Laidlaw and Akins
standing law as a trajectory, then these cases are understandable as
further movement in the direction sought by Justice Scalia.  As a mat-
ter of faithful adherence to precedent, however, these most activist
judicial statements by Justice Scalia embraced in Magnesium Elektron
and the original panel opinion in Gaston arise in portions of opinions
where concurring or dissenting opinions rendered his active second-
guessing of legislative judgments a minority Court view.  The criti-
cally important Justice Kennedy Lujan concurrence left Justice Scalia
in the Court minority on Congress’ ability to “define injuries and ar-
ticulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before . . . .”170
Laidlaw’s seven-justice majority emphasized the importance of
judicial deference to legislative judgments about actionable citizen
claims, the deterrent effects of penalties, and conceptions of moot-
ness.171  Standing analysis has once again been focused on the reality
of a litigant’s stake in a dispute, as made actionable under a regula-
tory regime creating a statutory universe of goals and incentives.  Fur-
thermore, for a substantial majority of the Court, analysis of a regula-
tory regime’s goals and effects appears to be made at the level of
examination of the regime’s general effects; contrary to Justice
Scalia’s preferred approach, a Court majority does not, in the stand-
ing context, look for case-specific proof of deterrence or redress.
B.  Regulatory Effectiveness and the Courts’ Limited Institutional
Competence
Laidlaw’s explicitly stated deference to political judgments about
statutory goals and process is appropriate not merely because of the
centrality of legislative supremacy under the United State’s legal sys-
tem.  From a comparative institutional analysis perspective, courts are
simply unsuited to evaluate independently either general legislative
170. 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. See 528 U.S. at 189.
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judgments about statutory goals and process or the significance of
particular legal breaches and associated litigation.172
Courts presented with regulatory disputes and a standing chal-
lenge see no more than a sliver of the regulatory process out of which
litigation arises.  Even if a court can figure out the exact series of
regulatory actions surrounding the legal challenge, the court has no
way to know what underlying procedural devices and political rela-
tionships actually are significant to ultimate regulatory choices.  In
Lujan, for example, Justice Scalia only garners plurality support for a
redressability framework requiring case-specific proof of how agency
consultations about federal funding might influence the agency with
final decision-making authority or influence funding recipients.  The
lack of majority support here makes sense in light of institutional
limitations that preclude courts or litigants from ever knowing how
highly political and discretionary decisions might be influenced by
statutorily required consultations or other deliberative processes.
For example, the Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”) and the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) share re-
sponsibility for reviewing applications for “dredge and fill” wetland
permits under the Clean Water Act.173  Both agencies are required to
enforce the statute’s presumption against wetlands development, but
the EPA is only authorized to intervene and veto such permits where
the EPA concludes there are significant adverse environmental ef-
fects.  The COE shares such authority, yet the EPA, perhaps due to
its more exclusively environmental focus contrasted with the COE’s
172. Comparative institutional analysis examines the relative capabilities of institutional ac-
tors that might be given a particular policy goal or task.  Such analysis builds off of public choice
and positive political theory approaches to legal analysis, but generally reflects a less pessimistic
view of the capabilities of politics to address societal problems.  See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1994).  For further refinements of Komesar’s analysis and assessments of comparative
institutional analysis, see Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 959 (1997) (reviewing Komesar’s book and offering additional elements for as-
sessing institutional competence); Edward L. Rubin, Institutional Analysis and the New Legal
Process, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 463 (reviewing Komesar’s book as well); see also Edward L. Rubin,
The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) (tracing the development of comparative institutional analysis and
arguing for “closely analyzed institutional context” instead of overly simplified analytical ap-
proaches).
173. For discussions of “dredge and fill” permits and the shared COE and EPA turf, see Mi-
chael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zalecha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water Act:
Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L.
REV. 695 (1989); Oliver A. Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands:  The Army-EPA Memorandum
of Agreement on Mitigation Under the § 404 Program, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,212 (June 1990).
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focus on engineering, appears to evaluate environmental effects with
greater rigor than the COE.174  However, assessments of these differ-
ent agencies’ political cultures and how those proclivities will play out
in the setting of a particular permit dispute are difficult for the courts
and litigants to make.  This overlapping COE and EPA turf never-
theless reflects a legislative judgment that such a dual role might
make a difference.
Yet another example of a scheme where courts logically should
not require case-specific proof of changed outcomes is under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  NEPA has again and
again been construed merely to force analysis of environmental ef-
fects rather than mandate particular environmental results.175  How
that analytical process will in any particular environmental dispute in-
fluence agency choices is unpredictable.  A high-stakes government
action subject to NEPA analysis will often set in motion pitched po-
litical battles, delay the agency action, and trigger scrutiny under
other bodies of law.176  How such a multi-stage, multiple stakeholder
political process will play out will often be impossible to forecast or
prove.
For the same reasons early political science “pluralist” analysis
erred in assuming that overt political contacts reflect political power
and in underplaying the clout of interests that may never need to seek
an audience with politicians, it would be erroneous to assume that
only regulatory participation that can be recorded influences out-
comes.177  Because high stakes discretionary government actions are
subject to polycentric pressures, where different stakeholders wield
disparate amounts of clout, and where that clout may be felt without
any overt stakeholder action, the regulatory “record” that can be
174. See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Con-
sideration of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV.
1242, 1254-57 (1995) (discussing COE and EPA § 404 roles and reasons EPA’s role keeps “the
system focused on its statutory goals”).
175. For a comprehensive gathering of materials about NEPA and its construction by the
courts, see JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (1992).
176. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 810, 817-18, 849-56 (2d ed.
1992).
177. For a summary of “pluralist” assumptions, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 49-51 (2d ed.
1995).  For exploration of reasons that analysis of politician-citizen contacts will misapprehend
political power and likely political results, see generally PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS
(1981) (exploring limitations of pluralist political science in understanding issues local govern-
ments actually are willing to address and exploring structural reasons that redistributive policies
are particularly uncommon at the local level).
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placed before a court will necessarily be incomplete.178  Case-specific
assessment of whether an alleged legal breach will influence a regula-
tory or environmental outcome is simply beyond judicial competence.
As Professor Fletcher argued in 1988, standing questions about
causation and redressability “should be asked at the level of general
rule formation, rather than at the level of predictions made in indi-
vidual cases.”179  Judicial review of allegations of illegality that starts
with the assumption that legislative and regulatory choices will always
have some kind of influence is consistent with conceptions of legisla-
tive supremacy and acknowledgment of limited judicial competence.
The Laidlaw and Akins Courts’ enforcement of required regulatory
process, despite uncertainties about the effects of that enforcement,
accords with that limited competence.180
III.  “INJURY IN FACT,” A POSSIBLE SCALIA RATIONALE, AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF PRECEDENT
Carrying the previous parts’ analysis further, it is difficult to jus-
tify holding onto any aspect of the “injury in fact” requirement as
fleshed out in Justice Scalia’s Lujan majority opinion.  The overall
legislative bargain includes, as part of its substantive and procedural
package, citizen-suit enforcement.  That citizen-suit threat modifies
the behavior of all stakeholders under the environmental laws.
Standing barriers to citizen litigation will alter the dynamics of law
implementation and regulation promulgation, long before any par-
ticipant in that process even decides to commence litigation.181  The
legal arsenal of each regulatory participant influences the clout that
stakeholder will wield in the process of statutory implementation.  To
undercut the viability of citizen suits for any litigants other than those
who can show some tangible “injury in fact” weakens citizen power in
178. See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park:  Political and Judicial Controls Over
Administrative Action Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992) (exploring the
complex and lengthy political skirmishing leading up to regulatory decisions to allow building of
a highway extension through a Memphis park and questioning the Supreme Court’s judicial re-
view assumptions in such a “polycentric” political setting).
179. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 242.
180. Lujan’s footnotes 7 and 8 similarly are consistent with the view that courts cannot and
should not look for outcome specific results of discretionary agency process.  See supra notes 40-
45 and accompanying text.  As Professor Pierce observed in his critique of Lujan, a standing
framework that requires case-specific judicial assessment of the significance of particular legal
breaches empowers courts and changes standing doctrine from a doctrine rooted in conceptions
of judicial restraint into “a judicially enforced doctrine of congressional restraint.”  Pierce, supra
note 2, at 1199.
181. See Buzbee, supra note 33, at 768-73.
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all aspects of statutory implementation and will likely modify regula-
tory outcomes.  If regulatory targets can make more realistic litigation
threats, risk averse agencies and their administrators are likely to give
greater weight to the targets’ concerns than to those of beneficiaries
who will find it harder to be heard in court.182  As well-argued in the
past by Professors Fletcher, Nichol, Pierce and Sunstein, logic argues
strongly for standing analysis tied merely to the presence or absence
of a statutorily conferred cause of action.183
At this time, however, too many decisions have embraced at least
a limited “injury in fact” framework to justify its wholesale abandon-
ment.  Much of Lujan has been limited in subsequent exposition of its
rationale, but in case after case, a majority of the Supreme Court has
looked to see if a citizen litigant is in some sense different from the
general public in her interest in the litigation.  The focus on physical
proximity to threatened resources, on a litigant’s common law-like
harms resulting from government action or permit violations, or on
evidence of a plaintiff’s actual stake in or enjoyment of an amenity for
its environmental or aesthetic features all make sense as devices to
ensure litigants have a genuine stake in the controversy placed by
Congress before the courts.  This core of Lujan appears to be a dura-
ble precedent.  To recall the musical analogy mentioned above, this
strain or theme is consistent across the last decade of standing cases,
and in fact can be traced back to 1970s standing analyses, but Laidlaw
provides an important resolution of this period of competing standing
approaches.
Retaining this core of standing analysis also at least slightly ad-
dresses Justice Scalia’s inchoate Article II standing strain of logic.  In
Lujan and in his dissent in Laidlaw, he explains his approach as in
part rooted in his view of Article II’s mandate that the President
“take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”184  Under this view,
the more enforcement decisions are handed to citizens, the more this
portion of the President’s constitutionally assigned role is undercut.
Yet Justice Scalia nowhere argues that citizens can never enforce
statutory law.  In dozens, if not hundreds, of administrative law cases
heard by Judge and later Justice Scalia, litigants sued under enabling
act or APA-based provisions, in essence enforcing statutory law by
seeking to ensure the laws are “faithfully executed.”  Even in his re-
cent articulations of Article II’s role in standing analysis, Justice
182. See id.
183. See sources cited supra note 2.
184. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
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Scalia gives no indication that he now rejects the constitutional valid-
ity of such run of the mill public law litigation.  Furthermore, in Jus-
tice Scalia’s majority opinion regarding qui tam suit whistleblower
standing, he concludes that such citizens can have standing under an
“assignee” theory under which “the United States’ injury in fact suf-
fices to confer standing upon [the whistleblower].”185
Justice Scalia’s Article II argument is thus best understood as re-
quiring that only a limited subset of citizens be allowed to supplant
(or perhaps more accurately, complement) the executive branch’s en-
forcement role.  Only citizens who show that they have a distinctive
stake in the litigation such that they are different from mere bystand-
ers or the general public can be heard in federal courts.186  By retain-
ing the more limited injury in fact test that this article suggests is all
that remains of Lujan, Justice Scalia’s Article II concerns are also ad-
dressed.
CONCLUSION
All statutes reflect diverse legislative goals and an array of pro-
cedural devices to move toward attainment of those statutory goals.
Standing analysis appears now to require a judicial affirmation that a
citizen empowered by a statutory cause of action actually has an in-
terest in litigation setting her apart from the general public.  This as-
pect of “injury in fact” analysis, that looks for a litigant to have a so-
called “concrete interest,” is unlikely to change.  This “concrete inter-
est” can include the environmental and aesthetic interests of the liti-
gant, provided that she has a connection to an amenity or interest af-
fected by a legal violation.
This article has shown, however, that despite this substantial ju-
dicial standing role, a consistent but concededly contested strain in
standing jurisprudence has now been decisively resolved by Laidlaw,
fashioning a standing framework that gives great weight to the statu-
tory universe of goals, process and incentives.  Laidlaw does not con-
stitute a judicial about face, but instead is consistent with a line of
logic embraced by a Supreme Court majority from Lujan to the pres-
ent.
185. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858,
1863-64 (2000).  On statutory grounds, however, the Court concluded that Stevens, the whistle-
blower, could not sue a state for qui tam liability.  See id. at 1865-71.
186. I acknowledge the assistance of Professors Michael Axline, William Funk and Craig
Oren for engaging in an environmental law professors’ internet debate that refined my under-
standing of how Justice Scalia’s Article II analysis fits into his standing jurisprudence.
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This Laidlaw resolution is not only consistent with a durable
strain in previous opinions, but is also appropriate in light of concep-
tions of legislative supremacy and the limited institutional compe-
tence of courts.  Standing law does not empower courts to assess in-
dependently the effects of a particular statutory breach.  Instead,
courts must show deference to legislatively determined goals and
means.  Laidlaw may have only partially articulated why such defer-
ence is appropriate, but the case does much to affirm that a solid Su-
preme Court majority believes in the necessity of a more restrained
judicial standing role under our Constitution.  Especially in analyzing
the “traceability” and “redressability” prongs of standing, courts
should heed explicit or implicit legislative judgments about interests
created or protected and about the importance of legislatively chosen
procedures for furthering those interests.  After Laidlaw, courts en-
gaged in standing analysis cannot second-guess legislative goals and
the effects of the procedures chosen to achieve those goals.
